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Correspondence

Still Patently Unconstitutional:
A Reply to Professor Nard
Margo A. Bagleyt
In Defense of Geographic Disparity' is Professor Craig
Nard's response to my article Patently Unconstitutional: The
Geographical Limitation on Prior Art in a Small World (Patently Unconstitutional).2 According to Professor Nard, my article advocates "the elimination of [the] geographic disparity" of

35 U.S.C § 102 in order to "protect developing nations and
indigenous peoples from Western countries' patent law
regimes." 3 Professor Nard is correct in his assertion that I seek
the elimination of the geographical disparity in U.S. patent
law; however, he misses the mark as to my reasons. My
opposition to the geographical limitation does not derive from a
desire to protect anyone from valid patent rights,4 rather it is a
result of my conclusion that § 102(b) is unconstitutional.'5
t Associate Professor of Law, Emory University School of Law. Special
thanks to Samuel Bagley, Anita Bernstein, Dorothy Brown, Bill Carney, Cynthia Ho, Marc Miller, Ruth Okediji, and Robert Schapiro for their helpful
comments, and to Kristen Gerdelman for her able research assistance.
1. Craig Allen Nard, In Defense of Geographic Disparity, 88 MINN. L.
REV. 222 (2003).
2. Margo A. Bagley, Patently Unconstitutional:The GeographicalLimitation on PriorArt in a Small World, 87 MINN. L. REV. 679 (2003).
3. Nard, supra note 1, at 223-24.
4. I do ascribe to the view, however, that the wholesale imposition of
Western intellectual property rights schemes on developing countries via the
Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS) is detrimental to many in the developing world. See generally Margo A. Bagley,
Legal Movements in IP: TRIPS, UnilateralAction, BilateralAgreements and
HIVIAIDS, 18 EMORY INT'L L. REV. (forthcoming Fall 2003) (arguing that
Western intellectual property rights schemes significantly impede treatment
of HIV/AIDS in the developing world); Ruth L. Gana (Okediji), Has Creativity
Died in the Third World? Some Implications of the Internationalization of
Intellectual Property, 24 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POLY 109 (1995) (arguing that
Western rights schemes negatively affect creativity in the developing world).
5. This conclusion is based on my analysis of evidence regarding (1) the
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At least two key points from Patently Unconstitutional
bear repeating to shed light on this subject. First, publicly
accessible patents and printed publications located anywhere
in the world, in any language, have been considered prior art
for patent-defeating purposes since the first patent statute.7

Public accessibility has been judicially defined to include even a
single copy of a doctoral thesis, in German, indexed and cata-

loged in a small German library, unlikely though it might be
for an interested person to find that document.8 The justification for such an expansive definition that prevents many pat-

ents from issuing is the Constitution: "Congress [in the exercise
of the patent power] may not authorize the issuance of patents

whose effects are to remove existent knowledge from the public
domain, or to restrict free access to materials already avail-

able."9 With profound increases in world travel, technology,
ethnobotanical research, and bioprospecting agreements, "libraries" today include traditional knowledge known and shared
by indigenous groups in countries outside the United States. 0
The form and location of information can no longer credibly or

constitutionally be maintained as a basis for determining patent-defeating ability when, to protect the public domain, public
accessibility is the touchstone for determining prior art status.
Second, significant evidence supports my contention that
the limitation in 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) that prevents prior knowl-

edge and use of an invention outside the United States from being considered patent-defeating prior art violates the IntellecFramers' intent in drafting the Intellectual Property Clause, (2) congressional
and judicial interpretations of constitutional requirements, and (3) technologydriven changes in the public accessibility of foreign public knowledge and/or
use. For a full analysis, see Bagley, supra note 2, at 704-24.
6. Courts have defined the term "printed publications" expansively. See,
e.g., In re Hall, 781 F.2d 897, 898 (Fed. Cir. 1986) ("The statutory phrase
'printed publication' has been interpreted to give effect to ongoing advances in
the technologies of data storage, retrieval, and dissemination."). Thus, information on microfilm, videotape, or even the internet can be a printed publication within the meaning of § 102(b) so long as it meets one key requirement:
public accessibility. See id.
7. See discussion and cited cases in Bagley, supra note 2, at 708-12; see
also Hodosh v. Block Drug Co., 786 F.2d 1136, 1138-40 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (utilizing ancient Chinese texts as prior art).
8. See Hall, 781 F.2d at 899-900.
9. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966); see also Aronson v.
Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 262 (1979) ("[Tlhe stringent requirements for patent protection seek to assure that ideas in the public domain remain there for the free use of the public.").
10. Bagley, supra note 2, at 712-17.
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tual Property Clause of the Constitution. 1 Such evidence
includes (1) understandings of the Framers' abhorrence of monopolies on non-novel, publicly available items; (2) comments
by some of the Framers evidencing a belief that patents of importation were unconstitutional; and (3) actions of the First
Congress in drafting the Patent Act of 1790 and explicitly deleting a provision that would have limited non-documentary prior
art to the United States resulting in a non-geographically
lim12
ited (in terms of prior art) first patent statute.
In light of all this evidence, I find it puzzling that Professor
Nard's response focuses on policy issues and fails to fully
engage my constitutional arguments. 3 Professor Nard merely
states that patent law is utilitarian and that the driving force
behind the Constitution's Intellectual Property Clause is the
enhancement of public welfare. " I agree that patent law is
utilitarian and that the United States does not ascribe to a
natural rights view of patents.15 In fact, Congress is not required to grant patents at all; the Intellectual Property Clause
simply authorizes it to do so if it chooses, in order to promote
the progress of the useful arts. 6 To suggest, however, that we
should grant patents solely based on their utility in "enhancing
the public welfare," however that is defined, disregards constitutional constraints as well as a wealth of interpretive statutory and case law in this area. For example, patents of importation have never been statutorily adopted in the United States
even though at the time of the Constitution and beyond, England granted such patents to encourage the introduction of
products and ideas, known elsewhere but new to England, into

11.

See id. at 712-17.

12.

See id. at 704-08.

13. My arguments in Patently Unconstitutional focused on an analysis of
the unconstitutionality of the § 102(b) geographical limitation on prior art. See
id. at 704-24. I also pointed out that the limitation was bad policy, but such
arguments were, of course, secondary to my central thesis. See id. at 727-29.
14. Nard, supra note 1, at 224-25.
15. In rejecting a natural rights view of intellectual property protection,
Thomas Jefferson stated:
Inventions then cannot, in nature, be a subject of property. Society
may give an exclusive right to the profits arising from them, as an
encouragement to men to pursue ideas which may produce utility, but
this may or may not be done, according to the will and convenience of
the society, without claim or complaint from anybody.
Graham, 383 U.S. at 9 n.2 (quoting 6 WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 180-

81 (Henry A. Washington ed., 1853-54)).
16. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
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the realm. 7 Such patents would have been very useful to the
fledgling American republic, greatly in need of industry and
ideas, yet apparently, because they were believed to be unconstitutional, they were not allowed. 8 Thus, the patenting of even
very useful information in the global public domain violates the
Constitution, regardless of its potential to "create wealth" or
"enhance public welfare."
Certainly patents on subject matter that is non-novel
and/or obvious in view of prior knowledge and the use of information available outside the United States may result in some
pharmaceuticals reaching the market that otherwise might
not.' 9 That, however, does not justify retaining the geographical
limitation on prior art any more than it justifies eliminating
patents and printed publications as patent-defeating prior art.
Any novel or nonobviousness limitation on patentability,
including the traditional limitations for prior art patents and
printed publications, prevents an entity from patenting public
domain information even if such a patent, if allowed, would enhance the public welfare. With these existing limitations in
mind, the real question should be whether a patent enhances
the public welfare, and the answer to this question depends on
how "public welfare" is defined.
Professor Nard's arguments reflect a somewhat narrow
view that public welfare is enhanced if products that otherwise
might not have been developed are commercialized and made
available to the public as a result of patents, 20 but that is only
part of the equation. What about the costs to the public, such as
lack of competitive entrants, of a patent on publicly accessible
information? What about the costs to traditional knowledge
holders within and outside of a contracting group or the cost to
traditional knowledge holders who desire to share knowledge
freely, but not have it under any exclusive control? What about
17. Bagley, supra note 2, at 704-08.
18. James Madison opined, "Your idea of appropriating a district of territory to the encouragement of imported inventions is new and worthy of consideration. I cannot but apprehend however that the clause in the constitution
which forbids patents for that purpose will lie equally in the way of your expedient." Letter from James Madison to Tech Coxe (Mar. 28, 1790), in THE
PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 128 (Charles F. Hobson & Robert A. Rutland eds.,
1981) (first emphasis added); see also Bagley, supra note 2, at 696-98 (describing the origins and early history of patent law in the United States).
19. See Nard, supra note 1, at 226, 229-31.
20. See id. at 231-37 (arguing that commercialization benefits consumers,
pharmaceutical companies, and indigenous populations alike).
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the environmental costs and the cost to future biodiversity
efforts if the continued development of such traditional knowledge disappears? Surely such concerns and reductions in competition and free access would have to be subtracted from any
potential benefit in order to ascertain a true net effect on public
welfare.
I also find Professor Nard's arguments supporting retention of the geographical limitation in U.S. patent law troubling
for a different reason. As Professor Nard notes, "there is a tendency to adopt a paternalistic attitude when discussing patent
rights and the developing world."2 1 Unfortunately, Professor
Nard's arguments regarding retention of the geographic limitation are perfect examples of such paternalism. Professor Nard
seeks to retain the patent-defeating status of information
known or used (but not patented or published) in the United
States while denying such status to comparable information
known outside of the United States.22 By seeking to retain geographic limits on prior art only for information known or used
outside the United States, Professor Nard effectively devalues
the information created and maintained by traditional knowledge holders, since such information does not have the same
ability to defeat patents as other publicly accessible information. Using a different patentability standard to evaluate prior
art based on who developed the information and how it has
been preserved implicitly suggests that knowledge held by traditional knowledge-holding groups (TKHGs) has less value
than other types of information.23 Maintaining this double
standard in order to ostensibly and haphazardly "create
wealth" for certain indigenous groups and provide incentives
for pharmaceutical companies to obtain patent-based monopolies over obvious and/or non-novel information is demeaning
and unwise.
Moreover, Professor Nard's arguments for retaining the
geographical limitation on prior art are inconsistent with the
21. Id. at 237.
22. Id. at 231-37. This limitation even applies to information from our
neighbors Canada and Mexico. See, e.g., Bagley, supra note 1, at 701-04.
23. Others have aptly illustrated this value bias. For example, in her discussion of the Western, value-laden focus on writing, Professor Ruth Gana
(Okediji) quoted the following: "[Tihe use of letters is the principal circumstance that distinguishes a civilized people from a herd of savages incapable of
knowledge or reflection." Gana (Okediji), supra note 4, at 114 (quoting
EDWARD GIBBONS, 1 THE HISTORY OF THE RISE AND FALL OF THE ROMAN

EMPIRE 234-35 (Womersley ed., 1994).
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reality that traditional knowledge is dynamic, not static, as are
the locations of members of TKHGs. 24 Traditional knowledge
about plants and animals is often shared among multiple cultures that may not be located in the same geographic area.25
Professor Ruth Okediji notes that in addition to different cultures sharing traditional knowledge, individual members of
TKHGs often leave the local group and move to other parts of
the world, taking their knowledge with them.26 Professor
Okediji also articulates two implications of these realities: (1)
the geographical limitation allows individuals who have left the
group to obtain patents on obvious inventions derived from the
traditional knowledge, and (2) any agreement between a research entity and a TKHG is likely to exclude many holders of
traditional knowledge covered by the agreement. 7
Professor Nard and I agree that traditional knowledge
holders should be compensated for the knowledge they share
with entities that later obtain patents based on the shared information; 28 however, we disagree on the role patent law generally and the geographical limitation in particular should play in
achieving that compensation. I am intrigued by Professor
Nard's proposal for a statutory scheme requiring compensation
agreements between patent applicants and traditional knowledge holders for patentable (novel and nonobvious) subject matter derived from traditional knowledge. 29 Fraudulent activity
and violation of sovereign rights in relation to genetic resources
such as plants should be bases for rendering a patent unenforceable when such actions are proven.30
24. Ruth L. Okediji, Making Room at the Table: The Protection of Traditional Knowledge at the Interstices of Intellectual Property, International
Law, and Human Rights 23 (2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 25-26.
28. See Nard, supra note 1, at 231. I also believe traditional knowledge
holders should be able to obtain patents on novel and nonobvious inventions to
the same extent as anyone else, whether or not the inventions are based on
traditional knowledge. I also advocate the exploration, as WIPO is doing, of
the feasibility of a sui generis system to protect traditional knowledge that
does not fit within Western patent parameters. See IntellectualPropertyNeeds
and Expectations of Traditional Knowledge Holders 7, World Intellectual
Property Organization (WIPO) (Apr. 2001), http://www.wipo.org/globalissues/
tk/ffnreport/final/pdffpartl.pdf.
29. See Nard, supra note 1, at 232-33.
30. See id. at 232 n.56.
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But how would one craft and implement such a requirement? What about TKHGs that do not want exploitation of
their knowledge and/or genetic resources even with compensation? In a compensation agreement, who has to be compensated? At what level must they be compensated? Some agreements to share traditional knowledge may result in multiple
valuable patents, not just one. Yet even the Merck-INBio agreement applauded by Professor Nard does not appear to tie
royalties to patented subject matter,3 ' and the uncertainty
associated with the ultimate grant of any patents and the relatively unequal bargaining power would likely depress any negotiated rates.32 More importantly, however, ensuring compensation for traditional knowledge holders does not require
retention of the geographical limitation on prior art. We can
and should have one without the other. The underlying subject
matter of any given patent still must not remove publicly accessible information from the public domain."
Professor Nard views the geographical limitation as a tool
to increase wealth for TKHGs while bringing desirable new
drugs to the marketplace.34 These are lofty and generally unexceptional goals; Professor Nard has simply selected an inappropriate and largely ineffective tool to achieve them. Even if the
geographical limit on prior art were constitutional, retaining it
in order to obtain new pharmaceuticals, as Professor Nard sug35
gests, would still be a bad idea, somewhat akin to using a
meat cleaver to perform a delicate surgical procedure. A patent
is a very powerful weapon with an effective seventeen-year
term3 that allows for the creation of a monopoly in the claimed
subject matter.3 7 The geographic limitation is too overbroad for
31. See id. at 233-34.
32. Such bargaining power would likely be even more unequal in deals
between large multinationals and local indigenous groups.
33. See Baxter Int'l, Inc. v. Cobe Labs., Inc., 88 F.3d 1054, 1058 (Fed. Cir.
1996). Whether oral or written prior art is publicly accessible is a question of
fact, determined on a case by case basis. Id. Unfortunately, the geographical
limitation prevents the fact question from even being asked.
34. See Nard, supra note 1, at 229-37.
35. See id. at 229-31.
36. See 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2000). United States utility patents have a term
of twenty years from the date of filing the first nonprovisional application. Id.
If the applicant does nothing to delay prosecution of the application by the
USPTO, the patent should have a term of at least seventeen years. Id.
37. See id.; see also Gary L. Reback, Patently Absurd: Too Many Patents
Are Just as Bad for Society as Too Few, Forbes.com, at http://www.forbes.com/
asap/2002/0624/044_print.html (June 24, 2002) ("[Platents are enormously
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Professor Nard's stated purposes because it not only excludes
knowledge and use information related to pharmaceuticals, but
also such information for any kind of invention."' Furthermore,
the geographic limitation excludes knowledge and use generated in developed countries outside the U.S. as well as such
information derived by indigenous groups in developing countries . Pharmaceutical patents allow drug pricing far beyond
what many consumers can afford yet they last for quite a long
time. 0 A solution tailored to the specific problem of pharmaceutical development from traditional knowledge sources would
better balance the need for incentives with the maintenance of
a robust public domain.
An example of such a tailored solution for achieving pharmaceutical development of publicly accessible information is
the Orphan Drug Act.4' This Act provides seven years of marketing exclusivity to FDA-approved companies that develop
drugs ineligible for patent protection or which otherwise would
not be developed because they are only useful to small patient
populations. 2 Such a statute provides important limited-term
incentives for pharmaceutical development outside of the patent system. For patent law academics such as Professor Nard
and myself, it is natural and understandably tempting to seek
patent law-based solutions to many problems. Nevertheless,

powerful competitive weapons that are proliferating dangerously, and the

[USPTO] has all the trappings of a revenue-driven, institutionalized arms
merchant."). A patent is not a true monopoly because it only gives its owner
the right to exclude others from an invention, not necessarily the right to practice the claimed invention. That right to exclude, however, can be the basis for
the creation of a true monopoly and at a minimum, can allow for monopolytype pricing. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2000).
38. For example, the neem tree controversy discussed by Professor Nard
and myself dealt with patents on pesticides, not drugs. See Bagley, supra note
2, at 680-82; Nard, supra note 1, at 222-23.
39. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000).
40. See id. The lengthy term of copyrights at life of the author plus seventy years makes the twenty-year term of patents seem insignificant by contrast. Compare 17 U.S.C. § 302 (2000) with 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2000).
41. See Orphan Drug Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 360aa-360ee (2000). Interestingly,
the constitutionality of the Orphan Drug Act itself is a source of debate. See,
e.g., Paul J. Heald & Suzanna Sherry, Implied Limits on the Legislative Power:
The Intellectual Property Clause as an Absolute Constraint on Congress, 4 U.
ILL. L. REV. 1187-89 (2000) (asserting that the provision is constitutional);
John J. Flynn, The Orphan Drug Act: An Unconstitutional Exercise of the Patent Power, 1992 UTAH L. REV. 389, 414 (arguing that the provision violates the
Constitution).
42. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 360aa-360ee.
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patents are neither the only nor often the best solution to many
problems, even in the realm of pharmaceuticals.
U.S. patents on inventions that are truly novel and nonobvious in view of publicly accessible information should be
available to any inventor, regardless of race, national origin, or
other suspect criteria. Congress's power to set patent policy is
circumscribed by constitutional limitations designed to provide
necessary incentives for innovation while protecting the public
domain from monopolies over publicly available information. 43
While retaining the geographical limitation on prior art might
result in some desirable benefits, such an argument could be
made for any of the patentability requirements, and does not
provide a compelling basis for the limitation's continued presence in U.S. law. While I appreciate Professor Nard's willingness to engage in discussion on a topic of such significance, his
defense of the geographic limitation alleviates neither its constitutional infirmity nor its negative policy implications for,
among other things, patent harmonization. 4 We still live in a
small, small world, and the geographic limitation on prior art is
still patently unconstitutional.

43. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 5 (1966) ("[Tjhe federal patent
power stems from a specific constitutional provision which authorizes the
Congress 'To promote the Progress of... useful Arts by securing for limited
Times to... Inventors the exclusive Right to their... Discoveries.'... The
clause is both a grant of power and a limitation.") (citation omitted).
44. Space constraints prevent me from addressing all of Professor Nard's
policy points. I refer the interested reader to Patently Unconstitutional for a
fuller explication of my general arguments on this topic. See Bagley, supra
note 2.
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